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Abstract: During the late 1990s a series of negative events occurred in the United Kingdom (UK) 
related to biotechnology. These events signaled potential risks associated with biotech foods and 
crops and were highly reported.  According to the trust asymmetry hypothesis, such events ought 
to cause public trust in risk managers of biotechnology to decline rapidly and rebound more 
slowly. We find, based on data taken from the Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 1996, 1999 
and 2002, that public trust in risk managers did decline from 1996 to 1999.  However, the level 
of trust rebounded sharply between 1999 and 2002. Canonical discriminant analysis of public 
trust is used to reveal possible explanatory factors in this response.  We find that whether people 
trust or distrust risk managers depends significantly on the amount of objective knowledge they 
have. We argue that knowledge of science might moderate the trust asymmetry effect. 
 
                                                 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Agricultural Economics Association meetings in 
Long Beach, CA, July 25, 2006. This research was supported in part by the Missouri Agricultural Experiment 
Station. Trust in Biotechnology Risk Managers: Insights from the United Kingdom, 1996-2002 
 
Introduction 
On March 20, 1996, the British government announced that scientists had discovered a new 
variant of Creudzfeldt-Jakob disease which had infected ten young victims. Importantly, 
scientists could not rule out a link with the consumption of beef from cattle infected with bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).  The announcement led to a drop in consumption of British 
beef of 40% (DTZ Pieda Consulting).  Some observers argued that the 1996 announcement 
“shattered any remnants of credibility enjoyed by the British government” (Powell and Leiss, 
1997, p.11), because BSE had been discovered in the British beef herd ten years earlier – over 
which time the British public was exposed to the infectious prions believed to cause BSE. 
Although the BSE episode is only indirectly related to biotech crops and foods, some have 
concluded that it contributed to a general climate of “extreme mistrust” of the UK Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (Powell and Leiss, 1997).  Such a climate of distrust could affect 
perception of subsequent technological developments, such as biotechnology. 
  Following the 1996 BSE announcement, there were a series of other alleged food and 
environmental safety events that were directly linked to biotechnology and were highly reported 
in the UK media (Marks et al., 2002, 2003). For instance, in 1998 Dr. Arpad Pusztai publicly 
stated that biotech potatoes fed to laboratory rats had caused severe damage to their organs and 
overall development. In 1999, John Losey and colleagues published a study suggesting that 
North American Monarch butterflies could be harmed by biotech corn pollen, which garnered 
international media attention.  In May 2000, genetically modified canola seeds not approved for 
  1commercialization in European markets were found in imported conventional varieties and 
unknowingly planted by UK farmers, an incident that was also highly reported by the UK media. 
  The relationship between public trust and reported events, such as those described above, 
is important because scholars have argued that trust in risk managers is a key factor in public 
perception and acceptance of complex technologies, such as biotechnology (White and Eiser, 
2005; Kasperson et al., 2003; Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000).  We are therefore interested in 
understanding how these events are correlated with public trust over time. In this context, we 
define risk managers as those persons or entities responsible for the development and control of 
biotechnology, including industry (which develops and utilizes biotechnology), universities 
(which conduct research leading to potential technological breakthroughs), and governments 
(which regulate biotechnology). Because these events center on the late 1990s, we examine data 
from the 1996, 1999 and 2002 waves of the Eurobarometer (European Commission, 1997, 2000, 
2003).
1 We find that the percent of respondents who had confidence (our measure of trust) in 
risk managers of biotechnology declined from 40.19 percent in 1996 to 34.39 percent in 1999, 
but it increased to 50.30 percent in 2002. We also observe a decline in public trust for each 
category of risk manager (industry, universities, and government) from 1996 to 1999 but an 
increase of trust in 2002 (see Figure 1). This finding is important because while a decline in 
public trust from 1996 to 1999 is predicted, the rebound in trust by 2002 is unexpected. 
According to the literature, negative risk events not only will be “trust-destroying,” but the effect 
should also be asymmetric in the sense that trust is easier to destroy than it is to create (Slovic, 
1993). Slovic and others have argued that trust-destroying events are often more visible than 
                                                 
1 Our data naturally brackets the peak in media coverage of potential risk events associated with food and crop 
biotechnologies (Marks et al., 2002, 2003). 
  2trust-creating events, are more highly reported therefore, and they are also usually perceived as 
being more credible than positive ones (Slovic, 1993; Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2001).
2  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
  Although the idea of trust asymmetry is recognized in the literature, “there has been 
relatively little empirical research on trust asymmetry” White and Eiser (2005, p. 1187).  What 
evidence does exist appears to be supportive (Slovic, 1993; Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2004; White 
and Eisier, 2005). However, scholars have also suggested that there might be factors moderating 
the trust asymmetry hypothesis. For example, White and Eiser (2005) find that the degree of 
“informational specificity” and how hazardous people perceive potential risks to be affect the 
level of trust.  The less specific the information and the lower the perceived risk to life or health, 
the less likely people will react negatively to risk information. Poortinga and Pidgeon (2004) 
provide evidence of a confirmatory bias, in which people interpret events according to their pre-
existing attitudes; people more inclined to accept biotechnology react less negatively toward 
negative information than those already opposed to the technology. 
  The purpose of this paper is to provide some insight into the pattern of trust observed in 
the 1996 to 2002 waves of the Eurobarometer. To this end we consider the possibility that 
respondents’ degree of trust in risk managers might vary by group.  Some distrustors might still 
trust other entities or organizations with respect to information or reports about biotechnology. 
Other respondents might be unwilling to trust any group or individual. Because we recognize the 
potential for there to be different categories with respect to trust, we use canonical discriminant 
                                                 
2 Following the approach of Slovic (1993) we label negative public events as “trust-destroying.”  However, more 
broadly any event that leads to an erosion of trust might be considered – whether singularly or as an accumulation of 
previous events.  
  3analysis to identify patterns in factors expected to correlate with public trust in risk managers 
during each of the three waves of the Eurobarometer survey. We find that perceptions of risks 
and benefits are correlated with public trust. However, we conclude that the observed rebound in 
trust is best explained by a combination of the confirmatory hypothesis and the importance of 
knowledge of science. 
 
Informational Events  
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or “mad cow” disease was first discovered in the 
British beef herd in November 1986.  By 1988 1,000 cattle had been discovered infected with 
BSE, and the UK government made it a reportable disease and instituted a ban on ruminant offal 
in cattle feed.  By August 1988, the government decided to slaughter and incinerate all cows 
suspected of having BSE and to provide compensation to farmers at 50 percent of the animal’s 
estimated worth (Powell and Leiss, 1997, p.5).  The British media began to speculate on a 
potential “unknown risk” (Slovic, 2001) associated with the consumption of beef from infected 
cattle.  The link between BSE and its potential for a human version of Creudzfeldt-Jakob disease 
(vCJD) was argued by British newspapers as early as 1988, “the possibility of BSE ‘jumping’ to 
human beings is far from absurd” noted the Guardian (Guardian, November 15, 1988, p.38).  
The government’s failure to compensate farmers fully for slaughter of infected cattle was also 
criticized as insufficient -- farmers would fail to report their diseased cattle if full compensation 
was not paid and infected animals might end up in the food supply.  Meanwhile, the government 
continued to argue that the disease had not affected meat, and could not be passed on to humans 
by that means.   
  4The first serious crisis of confidence in beef came in 1990 when “mad cat disease” was 
discovered – that is, BSE was found to have jumped the species barrier to cats.  Consumption of 
beef declined, although it eventually recovered during the early 1990s.  Then, in 1995, Granada 
Television’s World in Action broadcast a documentary about a nineteen-year-old boy who had 
died from CJD in May.   The government chose not to make any inquiry into the death and 
continued to argue that there was no evidence that BSE could cause CJD (Powell and Leiss, 
1997, p.8).  Other potential cases began to be identified through investigative reporting during 
1995.  On the industry side, slaughterhouse owners were told to tighten their practices as 
evidence emerged that some carcasses were leaving abattoirs without the offal removed. In late 
1995, the scientific debate concerning a link between BSE and CJD was conducted in British 
academic journals.  Yet the British government and industry continued to engage in “no-risk” 
messages.  Finally, British Health Secretary Stephen Dorrell made the announcement in March 
1996 that a possible link between BSE and vCJD (new variant CJD) existed. Powell and Leiss 
conclude that this announcement was made in a climate of extreme mistrust of the UK MAFF 
and that it “shattered any remnants of credibility enjoyed by the British government” (1997, 
p.11). 
 
Bovine Growth Hormone 
Bovine Growth Hormone (BGH) has been approved and marketed in the United States since 
1994.  First developed by Monsanto, its synthetic version (rBST or recombinant bovine 
somatotropin) is sold under the brand name Posilac and is a naturally occurring hormone injected 
into dairy cattle to increase their supply of milk.  Potential benefits of rBGH include an increase 
in the milk supply and a price reduction for consumers.  Studies conducted prior to its 
  5commercialization in 1994 had focused on animal health and milk quality, with researchers 
concluding that supplemental rBST did not increase the amount of BST in milk, that cows 
responded to natural BST and synthetic rBST in the same way, and that rBST did not alter milk 
composition (Bauman, 1992).   
Despite its apparent safety for human consumption, cows treated with rBGH can produce 
milk with higher levels of insulin-like growth factor 1 (IGF-1). Insulin-like growth factor 1, 
produced by humans as well as cows, plays a necessary role in many bodily functions.  As a 
result, there have continued to be calls for mandatory labeling of dairy products from rBGH-
treated cows in the United States.  And while the United States gave the green light to BGH in 
1994, the European reception was more negative.  In 1999, the European Union passed down a 
decision which prohibited its administration and marketing in the EU. This decision was not 
challenged in court resulting in a definitive ban on the use of rBST from January 1, 2000 
onwards.  The decision was based on animal health and welfare rather than human health 
concerns.  Specifically, rBST was determined to increase the risk of clinical mastitis, as well as 
the duration of treatment of mastitis in cattle. It was seen to increase the incidence of foot and leg 
disorders in cattle, to adversely affect reproduction, as well as to induce severe reactions at the 
injection site (Brinckman, 2000, p.170).   These regulatory decisions and concerns were covered 
in UK and US media.   
 
Pusztai Affair 
On August 10, 1998, Dr. Arpad Pusztai went on the UK World in Action program stating that 
GM potatoes fed to laboratory rats caused serious harm to their organs and health. His comments 
garnered significant media attention and were controversial.  The Rowett Research Institute in 
  6Scotland subsequently suspended Dr. Pusztai – eventually forcing him to retire ending a 35 year 
career – and placed a ban on him to refrain from talking to the media about his research findings.  
This ban remained in place for almost four months.  In the mean time, leading plant scientists 
from British universities and publicly funded research institutes criticized Pusztai’s findings and 
public statements, suggesting his work was a “red herring” and should not be used as an excuse 
to place a moratorium on the development and growth of genetically modified crops.  When Dr. 
Pusztai was allowed to talk to the media he further questioned the testing procedures for 
genetically modified foods noting that only one paper testing the food safety of genetically 
modified soya was available in a peer-reviewed international journal (Arthur & Connor, 
February 17 1999).   While Dr. Pusztai’s study was generally discredited by mainstream 
scientific societies and his own research institute, it was published as a Research Letter in The 
Lancet (Ewen and Pusztai, 1999).  The event sparked significant UK debate during late 1998 and 
1999 – effectively heightening coverage of and questioning the safety of genetically modified 
foods (Marks et al., 2002, 2003).   
 
Monarch Butterfly 
In 1999, John Losey and colleagues at Cornell University published a laboratory study in Nature 
which indicated that Monarch butterfly larvae could be harmed by biotech corn pollen.  Bt-corn 
has genes from Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) spliced into the plant genes.  These biotech corn 
hybrids are very effective against the European corn borer, a major corn pest that is destroyed by 
the plant’s toxic tissue.  The engineered corn is considered safe for human consumption.  
However, Monarch caterpillars feed on milkweed leaves which grow close to corn fields.  John 
Losey and colleagues’ research suggested that the Bt-corn pollen could represent a serious risk to 
  7populations of monarchs and other butterflies if the pollen landed on nearby milkweed and was 
consumed in the wild by the larvae.  The researchers recognized that more data were needed to 
confirm or refute this laboratory finding.  However, importantly the study’s initial findings 
signaled a potential and previously unanticipated risk associated with biotech crops.  As a result, 
the monarch butterfly event was highly reported and associated with a strong risk frame in UK 
media (Marks et al. 2006).  Moreover, the original study by John Losey and colleagues was 
published in the prestigious journal Nature, further adding to its newsworthiness and lending 
credibility to the study’s findings (Conrad, 1999; Mazur and Conant, 1978; Mazur, 1984, 1989; 
Singer and Endreny, 1993). Subsequent field studies conducted across the United States and 
Canada did not confirm the original study’s findings.   
 
GM Commingling 
On May 18 2000, imported conventional canola seeds in the UK were found to contain some 
biotech seed which had not been approved for commercialization in European markets at the 
time.  United Kingdom farmers unknowingly planted and multiplied them in their fields.  The 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fiber admitted that large quantities of biotech oilseed rape 
(canola) had been accidentally sown on up to 600 farms.  More than 22,000 acres of the 
commingled seed had been planted and harvested in Britain in the previous year.  A further 
11,750 acres were planted in the spring of 2000 before the “mistake” was discovered (Brown, 
2000).  This failure can be contrasted with the UK government’s stated policy which was not to 
allow biotech crops to be grown commercially until 2003, when farm-scale trials and other 
studies of environmental safety were to be completed.  This admission arguably signaled a 
  8failure of government and industry entities to effectively segregate biotech crops in the food 
supply. 
 
Pattern of Negative Media Events in the UK 
These episodes highlight the nature of media events that occurred in the UK during the mid to 
late 1990s. Importantly, these events coincide with an increase in the quantity of media coverage 
of agbiotech events in UK throughout the 1990s, which peaked in 1999 (see Figures 2 and 3, 
reproduced from Marks and Kalaitzandonakes, 2001).  Negative framing of agbiotech news also 
peaked during 1999 with coverage turning more positive post-1999 (Marks et al, 2002, 2003, 
2006). These negative frames have been driven by events that either signaled a potential risk or 
government inability to effectively manage and regulate the technology.  Importantly, no actual 
health and biosafety risks from biotechnology have been realized.   
 
Figures 2 and 3 about here 
 
  If negative media coverage impacts trust, as Slovic (1999) predicts, then according to the 
asymmetry hypothesis public trust in biotechnology risk managers should decline from 1996 to 
1999; that is, increasing distrust of risk managers is predicted. This finding is observed. 
However, if such effects are asymmetric – trust declines rapidly but rebounds more slowly – then 
the observed increase in reported public trust of UK risk managers between 1999 and 2002 is 
unexpected.  
  9  In order to shed further light on this observation the nature and characteristics of public 
trust need more careful examination. What follows is a discussion of factors that are expected to 
correlate with trust and distrust in order to further motivate our empirical analysis and findings.   
 
Public Trust and Risk Perceptions  
Although there are many ways of conceptualizing trust (see Hardin, 2001), at a minimum trust 
entails an expectation regarding the behavior of others, and that, to be meaningful, trusting 
behavior must create vulnerability in the person trusting (e.g., Hosmer, 1995; Mayer, Davis 
Schoorman, 1995; Nooteboom, 2002; James, 2002a). If, by trusting, we create vulnerability for 
ourselves, then we ought to have “good grounds” for doing so. According to Baier (1986, p. 
235), 
Reasonable trust will require good grounds for such confidence in another’s good will, or 
at least the absence of good grounds for expecting their ill will or indifference. Trust, 
then, …is accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or lack of 
good will) toward one. 
 
  If people need “good grounds” for trusting (or, conversely, for distrusting), then what are 
those grounds? What reasons might exist for someone to trust or distrust? Fundamentally, these 
reasons are rooted in the expectation of trustworthiness of the person or entity in whom trust is 
placed (James, 2002a). Slovic (1993, p. 677) offers an insightful reason for the importance of 
trustworthiness when he notes that trustworthiness requires “a relatively large number of 
confirming instances to establish the trait and a relatively small number of relevant instances to 
disconfirm it,” because favorable traits are “hard to acquire … and easy to lose,” while 
unfavorable traits are “easier to acquire and harder to lose.” 
  Expectations of trustworthiness reflect two distinct components – perception of the 
motives and incentives of those in whom trust is placed, and perception of their competence. For 
  10instance, Baier (1986, p. 240) states that “we trust [others] to use their discretionary powers 
competently and nonmaliciously” and Hardin (2004, p. 8) says that “trust depends on two quite 
different dimensions: the motivation of the potentially trusted person (or institution) to attend to 
the truster’s interests and his or her competence to do so.”  If either component of 
trustworthiness is lacking, then we would not expect there to be trust. Moreover, there is an 
important distinction between perceptions of honorableness and competence when understood 
within the context of intention. A person who intends to exploit a person’s trust should not be 
trusted, but, then neither should a person who would unintentionally do so. We would say a 
person is honorable if they do not intend to exploit another’s trust, while a person is competent if 
they would not unintentionally exploit another’s trust. 
  The literature on public trust and support for biotechnology is consistent with this general 
conceptualization of how expectations of honorableness and competence affect trust (James, 
2003, 2006). According to the literature, the public perceives that institutions responsible for the 
development, use and regulation of biotechnology face two biases – a reporting bias, which is an 
incentive to overstate benefits and understate risks, and a knowledge bias, which is an inability to 
fully anticipate all contingencies – when publicly communicating the risks and benefits of 
biotechnology research (Eagly, Wood, and Chaiken, 1978; Kasperson, 1986; Renn and Levine, 
1991; Dholakia and Sternthal, 1997; Peters, Covello, and McCallum, 1997).  The reporting bias 
aligns with the notion of perceived honorableness, whereas the knowledge bias aligns with the 
notion of perceived competence. When the public perceives that institutions responsible for the 
development, use, and regulation of biotechnology face a significant reporting bias or knowledge 
bias, they may have “good grounds” to distrust those institutions because of how these biases 
  11translate into perceived incentives to behave less than honorably or to behave incompetently, 
respectively. 
  Expectations of trustworthiness (honorableness and competence) are not the only factors 
expected to affect trust, however. One also has “good grounds” for trusting when one believes 
that doing so will result in some benefit or gain. For example, Baier (1986, p. 236) asks why we 
trust, or “why we typically do leave things that we value close enough to others for them to harm 
them.” Her answer is simply “that we need their help.” In other words, we trust when we need 
and expect some gain when our trust is correctly placed.  Consequently, the greater a person’s 
expected benefits from correctly trusting, the more likely he or she will trust, other things being 
equal. Conversely, one has “good grounds” not to trust – that is, to distrust – if one believes that 
the expected losses from mistrusting are too large. Mistrusting means incorrectly placing trust in 
someone who has a strong incentive to exploit that trust or who is incompetent. Thus, the lower 
the expected losses are from mistrusting, other things being equal, the more likely a person 
would be willing to trust. Expected honorableness and competence, expected gains from 
correctly trusting, and expected losses from mistrusting, jointly form key elements affecting the 
likelihood that trust will exist (James, 2002b). When people perceive that others are honorable 
and competent, and when the expected benefits from trusting are large enough relative to the 
expected losses from mistrusting, then they will likely trust others. However, “likely to trust” 
does not equate with “certainty.” Expectations of large benefits, low costs, and trustworthiness 
are necessary but not sufficient conditions, meaning their presence does not guarantee the 
existence of trust. Expectations of small or negligible benefits, high costs and untrustworthiness, 
on the other hand, would be expected to reduce trust and even cause distrust. 
  12Like trust generally, public trust is also affected by perceptions of trustworthiness, as well 
as by perceptions of the expected benefits from correctly trusting and expected losses from 
mistrusting (James, 2002b, 2003, 2006; Peters et al, 1997).  These perceptions in turn can be 
affected by how risks (and benefits) are communicated, that is, through framing of hazard events 
(Slovic, 1993; Eagly et al, 1978).  Because framing matters, and because expectations of benefits 
relative to costs and trustworthiness are necessary but not sufficient for trust, many observers 
have argued that public trust is fragile (Kramer, 1999) and exhibits an asymmetry (Slovic, 1993), 
in the sense that trust is difficult to gain but relatively easy to lose (Barber, 1983; Burt and Knez, 
1996; Dasgupta, 2000; Levi, 1998; Rempel et al. 1985).  Moreover, Slovic (1993) suggests that 
once trust begins to decline, negative information can hold more weight than positive 
information in decision-making over time. A negativity bias in trust related information occurs 
because negative information is generally easier to imagine or is more mentally available than 
positive information (White and Eiser, 2005, p.1189).  People also perceive negative information 
as more credible than positive information (Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2001). Trust suffers from a 
negative downward spiral whereby trust turns to distrust and distrust leads to withdrawal and 
ever greater distrust (Yamagashi, 2001).   These findings might explain why trust in UK 
biotechnology risk managers declined from 1996 to 1999, but they do not explain the observed 
increase in trust from 1999 to 2002.   
One possible explanation comes from White and Eiser (2005) who, in addition to finding 
general support for the trust asymmetry hypothesis, also found that the negative effect of 
information on trust was moderated for policy-related events and for events perceived as being 
lower-risk than for more concrete events and events considered high-risk. They conclude that 
positive-policy related information can partially counteract the effects of negative event-related 
  13information. This explanation is relevant to the UK case because while the events highly 
reported in the media were concrete, (e.g., commingling of biotech and non-biotech crops was 
found) they signaled potential rather than actual realized harms.  The potential harms highlighted 
in media coverage of biotech foods and crops can be contrasted with the actual deaths that have 
resulted from vCJD.
3    
Another plausible explanation is suggested by White, Pahl, Buehner and Haye (2003) and 
Poortinga and Pidgeon (2004), who postulate that a confirmatory bias might moderate reception 
of risk information. According to this hypothesis, prior beliefs and attitudes influence how 
people react to media events. Events consistent with prior beliefs confirm attitudes while events 
inconsistent with prior beliefs are discounted.  Hence, people generally supportive of 
biotechnology and trusting of biotechnology risk managers will be less influenced by negative 
coverage.  However, the knowledge that people possess can also influence information 
processing. Because lay publics do not always have a strong understanding of basic science, 
especially in the context of biotechnology (Durant, Bauer, and Gaskell, 1998; Miller, 1998), 
people may not have the capability to interpret correctly media messages regarding risks and 
benefits of biotechnology (Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000). In this case, people will have an 
incentive to trust scientists and other experts. Indeed, there is evidence that public trust of 
scientists is relatively high (Lang and Hallman, 2005; James, 2006). Hence, according to Siegrist 
and Cvetkovich (2000), the direction of causality is as follows: If people have little knowledge of 
science, then they will have an incentive to trust experts (e.g., scientists); if people trust 
scientists, then they will perceive less risks and more benefits from biotechnologies, especially if 
                                                 
3 Of course, hindsight is always 20-20.  Nevertheless, ten years post-marketing have revealed no significant health 
or environmental risks associated with biotech foods and crops. 
  14scientists and other risk managers make positive reports about the technology. This suggests that 
there should be a negative correlation between the knowledge people possess and social trust.  
The problem with this explanation is that it leaves open the question of whether low-
knowledge persons are more likely to trust than persons with adequate knowledge. It could be 
that people who are highly educated or have significant knowledge of science will have a basis to 
perceive whether statements and actions of experts are reasonable – that is, they may be in a 
position to make judgments on the trustworthiness or credibility of experts. In this sense social 
trust might be positively correlated with generalized knowledge and knowledge specific to 
science. In this context, generalized knowledge represents a broad education that may include 
knowledge of science, while knowledge specific to science refers to a correct understanding of 
scientific principles, especially those relating to genetics and biotechnology. If trust is positively 
correlated with knowledge, then knowledge might be a moderating factor of the trust asymmetry 
hypothesis. And, if people with knowledge have prior tendencies to accept biotechnologies, then 
any negative reactions they might have to negative media reports might not be lasting. We 
expand the literature on trust and trust asymmetry by examining not only how trust changes over 
time as a result of informational events but also how factors relating to trust, particularly 
measures of knowledge, affect trust over time.  
We also consider the possibility that respondents who do not trust risk managers might 
not be a homogeneous group. Studies typically either dichotomize trust into trust and no trust 
(e.g., James, 2003, 2006) or represent it as having increased or decreased (e.g., Slovic, 1993; 
White and Eiser, 2005; Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2004). However, we recognize that respondents 
who have little or no trust in risk managers may trust other entities (e.g., they show distrust 
toward risk managers), or they may not trust any entity (e.g., they show non-trust). Moreover, 
  15people who “don’t know” whether they trust risk managers may not be the same as people who 
simply do not trust anyone (see Faulkenberry and Mason, 1978). As we show below, an 
examination of factors expected to be correlated with trust and how they relate to different 
categories of trust (e.g., trust, distrust, nontrust and uncertainty, as defined in Table 1) provide 
insights into the finding that public trust in risk managers increased after a decline seemingly 
caused by negative media events. 
 
Analysis 
We use data from the 1996, 1999 and 2002 waves of the Eurobarometer to examine factors 
expected to correlate with trust in order to explain how trust-eroding events might affect trust. 
We focus on the United Kingdom only because the BSE, bovine growth hormone, Pusztai affair, 
Monarch butterfly and biotech commingling events are pertinent to the UK.   
In each wave of the Eurobarometer, respondents were asked how much confidence they 
have in various organizations to “tell the truth about modern biotechnology.”
4 The list of 
organizations includes industry, universities, government,
5 and other non-governmental, 
political, and special interest organizations. Respondents were given an option of indicating 
whether they have confidence in each of the listed organizations. We use confidence as our 
indicator of public trust in risk managers. If respondents indicated that they had confidence in 
industry, universities or national governments, then we defined that person as exhibiting trust in 
risk managers. If respondents did not indicate trust in industry, universities or government, then 
we defined the following variables: Respondents exhibited distrust if they did not indicate any 
                                                 
4 It is important to recognize the limitation of this question for our study.  “Biotechnology” is a broader concept than 
biotech foods and crops and is liable to invoke other kinds of applications including medical ones. 
5 In 1996 the option presented to respondents was “public authorities.” In 1996 and 2002, the term “national 
government bodies” was used instead.  
  16confidence in risk managers but did place confidence in other organizations, such as consumer or 
environmental interest groups, or religious organizations. Respondents exhibited nontrust if their 
response to which organizations they had confidence in was “none of the above.” Finally, 
respondents were uncertain if they indicated “don’t know.” We distinguish between nontrust 
(i.e., “no opinion”) and uncertain (i.e., “don’t know”) because research suggests these are 
distinct categories (Faulkenberry and Mason, 1978). People who respond with “no opinion” 
generally do so from a rational, informed state. In contrast, “don’t know” often indicates a degree 
of ignorance on the subject. Table 1 presents definitions and means for these as well as for all 
variables used in our analysis.  
  For explanatory variables we are constrained by the need to use the “same” explanatory 
variables for each year in order to provide a meaningful comparison across time. Unfortunately, 
the Eurobarometer does not always ask the same questions in each wave of the survey. Because 
trust is a function of expectations of benefits relative to costs (James, 2002b), at a minimum we 
need information on respondent perceptions of risks and benefits. Fortunately, we were able to 
construct a measure of perceived benefits and risks based on a set of commons questions across 
all three waves of the Eurobarometer. Perception of benefits was derived from the percent of 
respondents who believe biotechnology or genetic engineering will result in an improvement of 
life. Perception of risk was derived from the percent of respondents who “agree” or “tend to 
agree” that using biotechnology in food production or in the transferring of genes from plants to 
crops is too risky (see Table 1). In order to test the relationship between generalized knowledge 
and knowledge of science and trust, we include a variable indicating how old respondents were 
when they completed their fulltime education and a variable constructed from the total number of 
basic science and genetics questions respondents answered correctly (out of 9 possible answers). 
  17We assume that the older a person was when they completed their fulltime education, the greater 
is their generalized knowledge.
6 We also assume that the more science and genetics questions a 
respondent answers correctly, the greater is their knowledge of science.
7 As controls we include 
variables representing how frequently respondents talk about biotechnology as well as the 
respondent’s age and gender.  
  We observe that public trust in risk managers declines while distrust increases between 
1996 and 1999, but trust increases and distrust declines between 1999 and 2002. These changes 
are significant at the 5 percent level or better in difference of means test. The decline in public 
trust from 1996 to 1999 is expected as media attention on negative biotechnology events 
increased during this time period, peeking in 1999 (see Figures 2 and 3). Although trust in each 
type of risk manager (industry, universities and governments) declines between 1996 and 1999 
(see Figure 1), the change is significant for government only. However, trust increases between 
1999 and 2002 for each of these categories, albeit weakly, (p-value of 0.10 or lower). 
Furthermore, of the three types of risk managers, respondents trust universities most, followed by 
government, and finally industry. This pattern is consistent with previous research (Lang and 
Hallman, 2005). 
  Figure 4 reveals how trust changes between 1996 and 2002 relative to distrust, nontrust 
and uncertainty. First, between 1996 and 1999, distrustors of risk managers are the largest 
                                                 
6 The variable consists of three categories, coded as 1 if the respondent completed fulltime education at ages 0 
through 15, coded as 2 if between 16 and 19, and coded as 3 if education was completed at age 20 or later or still 
pursuing an education. 
7 The following are the science questions common to each year of the Eurobarometer. Respondents were asked to 
indicate whether the statement is true or false: 1. There are bacteria which live from waste water (true); 2. Ordinary 
tomatoes do not contain genes, while genetically modified tomatoes do (false); 3. The cloning of living things 
produces genetically identical copies (true); 4. By eating a genetically modified fruit, a person's genes could also 
become modified (false); 5. Yeast for brewing beer consists of living organisms (true); 6. It is possible to find out in 
the first few months of pregnancy whether a child will have Down's Syndrome (true) 7. Genetically modified 
animals are always bigger than ordinary ones (false); 8. More than half of human genes are identical to those of a 
chimpanzee (true); and 9. It is not possible to transfer animal genes into plants (false). 
  18percentage group, followed by trustors. By 2002, however, one-half of all respondents indicate at 
least some trust in risk managers. Second, those who do not trust risk managers do not appear to 
be a homogenous group. We observe clear differences among people who distrust risk managers 
but trust other organizations and entities, people who trust no one, and people who are uncertain. 
Third, the percent of respondents who express uncertainty with respect to public trust is 
relatively stable across all three waves of the Eurobarometer. Fourth, in 1999 the increase in the 
percent of people who distrust risk managers appears to come both from those who trusted risk 
managers in 1996 and those who trusted no group in 1996. However, after the peek in media 
coverage in 1999, some distrustors of risk managers became trustors while others became 
nontrustors. Because the Eurobarometer is not a panel study, we can only speculate as to 
whether the increase in trust in 2002 came from those who had trusted in 1996. Our analysis 
below lends some credibility to this possibility.  
Because people who do not trust risk managers are not a homogenous group, and in order 
to understand what factors distinguish respondents who trust or distrust risk managers, or who 
have no trust in any organization or who are uncertain, we conduct a canonical discriminant 
analysis of the data, using categories of trust, distrust, nontrust and uncertainty as the dependent 
variable. Our objective is to determine which variables discriminate among the four categories of 
trusting thereby allowing us to predict whether a respondent trusts, distrusts, has no trust or is 
uncertain. To accomplish this, the canonical discriminant procedure finds coefficients for the 
linear combination of explanatory and control variables that best separates or distinguishes 
among each of the categories of a dependent variable (in this case, the four possible trusting 
states). It does this K-1 times, thereby creating K-1 orthogonal discriminant functions, where K 
is the number of categories, such that the first discriminant function provides the best overall 
  19discrimination among the groups, the second function provides the second best discrimination, 
and so forth. We use canonical discriminant analysis rather than logistic regression because we 
cannot, a priori, assign a rank order to these four trusting categories. For example, if we could 
rank the categories hierarchally, such as trust, distrust, nontrust and uncertainty, then we could 
conduct a logistic regression analysis to determine how explanatory variables are correlated with 
trust. However, we have no basis to rank the categories in this way. Canonical discriminant 
analysis has the added advantage of determining whether the categories identified are in fact 
distinct categories. Are those who trust, say, distinct in a meaningful way relative to those who 
distrust, have no trust, or who express uncertainty with respect to the question of trusting 
biotechnology risk managers? If so, what explanatory variables can account for the distinctness? 
Canonical discriminant analysis can provide insight into this question and, as we explain below, 
help understand why our observation of trust in risk managers does not fully conform to the trust 
asymmetry hypothesis.  
  Table 2 presents correlation coefficients between the perceived benefits, risk, generalized 
knowledge and knowledge of science variables and the trust measures. Importantly, we observe a 
positive correlation between both knowledge variables and trust in risk managers, and a negative 
correlation between the knowledge variables and respondents having an uncertain response to the 
question of trust. This pattern holds for each year of the Eurobarometer and is contrary to the 
findings of Siegrist and Cvetkovich (2000), who suggested a negative correlation between 
knowledge and trust. Both knowledge questions are also highly and positively correlated with 
trust in scientists. Expected benefits of biotechnology is correlated with trust and negatively 
correlated with distrust and uncertainty.  
  20  Table 3 presents the results of the analysis. Because there are four categories of trust, the 
procedure calculates three discriminant functions. We report only the results for the first two 
functions, because the third function in each year is not significant. In order to show the relative 
importance of the variables in the discriminant functions, we report standardized coefficients. 
Examining initially the squared canonical correlation we find that the explanatory variables 
explain seven percent (in 1996) and ten percent (in 1999 and 2002) of the variability in the first 
discriminant function.
8 In fact, the fist function clearly separates each group from the other, and 
it is statistically significant for each of the three years. Moreover, knowledge of science is the 
dominant variable for this function, meaning that knowledge of science is the most important 
variable for discriminating among all four groups. Generalized knowledge, measured by the age 
(category) at which respondent ended fulltime education, is important in 1996 and 2002 but not 
in 1999. In the case of the second discriminant function, the explanatory variables explain one to 
two percent of the variability in the function across each year. This function is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level for 1996 and at the one percent level in 1999. Within this 
function, perceptions of risks and benefits are most responsible for discriminating among the 
four trust categories for years 1996 and 1999, while in 2002 the most important factors are 
perceived risks and generalized knowledge.  
  Based on this analysis, we can conclude there are differences among the four trusting 
categories. Accordingly, mean values of the group centroids for each function are reported in 
Table 2 and plots of these means are presented in Figure 5. As seen in Figure 5, the first function 
provides a clear distinction among the trust categories. Because this function is dominated by the 
variable representing knowledge of science, the positive coefficient on that variable implies that 
                                                 
8 Although this explains a small percentage of the variation in the dependent variable, overall F-statistics are highly 
significant. 
  21higher levels of basic science knowledge correspond to a movement from uncertainty to nontrust 
and distrust to trust. In other words, respondents with relatively high levels of knowledge of 
science respondents are more likely to trust risk managers than express distrust, nontrust or 
uncertainty. Respondents with very little knowledge of science are more likely to express 
uncertainty when asked about how confident they are in risk managers. Respondents with 
moderate knowledge of science either distrust risk managers or express no trust in any 
organization. Interestingly, the effect of the first function on distrust and nontrust, which is 
dominated by the knowledge of science variable, changes over time. In 1996 there is no 
significant difference between the categories of distrust and nontrust. In 1999 these categories 
become distinct along the first discriminant function, while in 2002 the distinctness remains but 
the relative position reverses.  
  Within the second discriminant function we observe only a distinction between trust and 
uncertainty on the one hand, and distrust and nontrust on the other hand. This function is 
dominated largely by perceptions of risks and benefits associated with biotech foods. Given the 
relative signs on the coefficients of these two variables, one can conclude that increases in 
perceived benefits and decreases in perceived risks result in respondents who are less likely to 
distrust or non-trust.  
 
Discussion 
The following summarizes our findings. First, knowledge of science seems to be an 
important mediating factor in the level of trust individuals place in risk managers.  Knowledge of 
science is correlated with trust (positively) and uncertainty (negatively), as well as with trust in 
scientists (positively) for each wave of the Eurobarometer (see Table 3). Second, generalized 
  22knowledge is important at the beginning and end of the analysis horizon, but not at the crucial 
period of 1999 when negative media events regarding biotechnology were at their peak. Third, 
there is little change in the category representing people who are uncertain (e.g., report “don’t 
know” when asked about whom to trust with respect to biotechnology issues).  On the other 
hand, categories comprising people who already have an opinion – whether they distrust or trust 
– change positions over time, suggesting that they might be affected by media events.  Third, 
perceptions of risk and benefits affect trust by making people either more or less likely to distrust 
risk managers, but knowledge of science dominates the first discriminant function, such that 
increased knowledge leads one to be more likely to trust risk managers. 
  We find a correlation between the timing of the increase in negative media coverage and 
the decline in trust of UK risk managers. We also find that trust increased, contrary to the trust 
asymmetry hypothesis. We believe that part of the reason for this observation rests with the 
confirmatory hypothesis (see Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2004), which states that people respond to 
information that confirms or reinforces their prior beliefs, when it is combined with an 
understanding of the role that knowledge generally, and in particular knowledge of science, have 
in mitigating the effects of negative media information. We postulate that when people hear or 
observe negative events, people will likely have some negative reaction (consistent with the 
negativity bias), for instance, by reducing their trust in risk managers. However, people who 
have an adequate knowledge of science will begin to sift through the media messages and, in 
time, may discount those reports that do not conform to their understanding of science. 
Generalized knowledge is not enough here. The important factor seems to be knowledge of 
(genetic) science, at least in the context of trust of biotechnology risk managers. Moreover, if the 
potential risks identified in media reports are not confirmed by further evidence (of harm) and 
  23through experience, as in the case of biotech foods and crops, these individuals might come to 
believe that the reports have less basis in fact.  Hence, the initial distrust created by negative 
media reports might be mitigated. In this case, knowledge of science seems to mitigate the 
negativity bias and, hence, moderate the trust asymmetry effects postulated by Slovic and others.  
  While most previous studies have focused on the relationship between acceptance of 
biotech foods and knowledge (see for example House et al, 2004) and effects of perceived risks 
and benefits on public trust in risk managers, our study finds a strong correlation between the 
level of trust placed in risk managers and knowledge about science, including biotechnology.  
This effect is robust over time. This finding is important as it suggests that educational programs 
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  27Figure 1: Percent of survey respondents from the UK reporting trust in industry, scientists, 
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Figure 2: Media Coverage of Agbiotech in UK Newspapers, 1990 – 2001 
 
 
Source: Marks and Kalaitzandonakes (2001). 
 
  28Figure 3: Linkage of agbiotech coverage with food safety risk events in UK Newspapers, 
1990 to 2001 
 
 





Figure 4: Percent of survey respondents from UK reporting trust, distrust, nontrust and 



























Source: Eurobarometer, 1996, 1999, 2002, UK only, authors calculations 
  29Figure 5. Location of group centroids from discriminant function analysis of trust, distrust, 





































































(c) Eurobarometer year 2002 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
  Eurobarometer Year 
 1996  1999  2002 
Risk Managers     
Percent of respondents who trust industry   4.60  3.17  5.53 
Percent of respondents who trust universities  28.61  26.73  44.55 
Percent of respondents who trust government  14.16  10.24  13.11 
TRUST: Percent of respondents who trust 
industry, universities (scientists), or 
government (i.e., biotechnology risk managers) 
40.19 34.39 50.30 
DISTRUST: Percent of respondents who distrust 
industry, universities and government, but trust 
other sources of information 
49.89 56.63 33.48 
NONTRUST: Percent of respondents who do not 
trust any sources of information 
2.59 1.10 9.55 
UNCERTAIN: Percent of respondents indicating 
uncertainty (i.e., “don’t know”) about trust of 
sources of information 
7.33 7.88 6.67 
      
Explanatory and control variables       
Percent who believe biotechnology or genetic 
engineering will improve life 
47.23 31.00 32.42 
Percent who definitely agree or tend to agree that 
using biotechnology in food production or 
transferring genes from plants to crops is too 
risky 
72.03 56.48 50.30 
Average of 3 age categories of when respondent 
finished fulltime education, where 0-15=1, 16-
19=2, and 20 and older=3. 
1.95 1.87 1.93 
Average of nine science questions that respondents 
answered correctly 
5.32 4.82 5.25 
Percent indicating they have ever talked about 
biotechnology  
44.43 38.29 35.53 
Percent male  47.02  46.17  45.15 
Average of 6 age categories, where 15-24=1,  
25-34=2, 35-44=3, 45-54=4, 55-64=6, and  
65 and older=6 
3.38 3.40 3.43 
N 1391  1358  1320 
Source: Eurobarometer, 1996, 1999 and 2002 years, UK only, authors’ calculation 
 Table 2. Correlation coefficients between key explanatory variables and trust variables. 
 
 




























































































































































































                    
Trust industry  0.060  -0.039 0.043 0.032    0.042 -0.062  0.004 0.022    0.094  0.008 -0.021 0.054 
Trust scientists  0.086  -0.027  0.146 0.118    0.146  0.027  0.124 0.191    0.167  0.046  0.156 0.203 
Trust government  0.107  0.014 -0.022 0.020    0.105  -0.032 0.047 0.026    0.124  -0.014  0.110 0.102 
                       
Trust  0.123  -0.015  0.103 0.099    0.152  0.026  0.122 0.176    0.177  0.042  0.169 0.214 
Distrust  -0.062 0.058 -0.022 -0.000    -0.123  0.044  -0.054  -0.039  -0.097  0.005  -0.076 -0.074 
Nontrust  -0.045 0.001 0.004 0.010    0.021 0.036 0.010 0.013    -0.054  -0.002  -0.103 -0.073 
Uncertainty  -0.083 -0.083 -0.154 -0.192   -0.048  -0.140 -0.119 -0.243    -0.107 -0.093 -0.074  -0.203 
                    
Bold indicates significant at 5% or better. 





  32Table 3. Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients and group centroids. 
 
 1996  Eurobarometer  1999  Eurobarometer  2002  Eurobarometer 
  Function 1  Function 2    Function 1  Function 2    Function 1  Function 2 
              
Will  improve  life  0.315  0.662  0.225  0.763   0.431  -0.247 
Risky  0.181 -0.552    0.197 -0.588    0.132 0.433 
Age  ending  education  0.402  0.108  0.248  0.271   0.415  -0.622 
Knowledge of science  0.501  -0.337    0.692  -0.258    0.681  0.371 
Talked  about  0.279  -0.117  0.199  0.095   0.033  0.221 
Male  0.230  0.315  0.193  0.093   -0.115  0.051 
Age  category  0.098  0.038  -0.014  0.215   0.203  0.277 















Canonical  correlation  0.263  0.104  0.311  0.134   0.322  0.101 
Squared  canonical  corr  0.069  0.011  0.097  0.018   0.104  0.010 
Wilke’s  Lambda  0.917  0.886  0.885 








              
              
G r o u p   C e n t r   o i d s             
Trust  0.203  0.099  0.316  0.132   0.291  -0.043 
Distrust  -0.033 -0.091    -0.066 -0.113    -0.163 0.065 
Nontrust -0.018  -0.218    0.23  -0.076    -0.342  0.181 
Uncertain  -0.882 0.149    -0.939 0.248    -0.888 -0.266 
              
Source: Eurobarometer, 1996, 1999 and 2002 years, UK only, authors’ calculation 
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